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Among the decisions reported during the past month are
several that present novel and interesting points of law, as well
as some cases of first impression, at least in the
Bailment
particular court. The Court of Common Pleas of
New York City has held that a restaurant keeper is liable, in
-the absence of due care, for the loss of a customer's wraps
'left in his charge, on the ground that the bailment is not
gratuitous, but for profit: Buttman v. Denneit, 30 N. Y.
:Suppl. 247. This is in accord with the previous decision of
the same court in Bird v. Everard, 23 N. Y. Suppl. ioo8, and
-of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Bunnell v. Stern,
;122 N. Y. 539; S. C., 25 N. E. Rep. 91o.
This reasoning
-would make any tradesman or business man liable for property put in his possession by customers, as has in fact been
-held in the case of a tailor: Rea v. Simmons, 141 Mass. 561;
S..C., 55 Am. Rep. 492; McCollin vi Reed, 16 W. N. C. 287.
'The Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled that the intent
-manifested by an advertisement for bids must govern its interBids
pretation; that when the advertisement is nothing
more than a suggestion to induce offers for a
.contract by others, it imposes no liability per se; and that
an advertisement reserving the right to reject any or all bids
gives the lowest bidder no right to the contract, even if the
body advertising for bids acted arbitrarily, capriciously and
through favoritism, in awarding the contract: Anderson v.
Board of Public Schools, 27 S. W. Rep. 61o.
It is held by the Supreme Court of New York, in accordance with the generl doctrine on the subject, that a deed from
,Cemeteries
a cemetery association to a lot in the cemetery,
e
though absolute in form, conveys no title to the
soil, but only a right of burial; and that, therefore, a statute
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.directing a removal of the bodies interred in a cemetery, with-out providing for compensation to the lot-owners, is constitutional: Went v. Metli. Prot. Ciz. of Williamsburgh, 30 N. Y.

.Suppl. 157.
In Meer v. Chic., H2.& St. P. Ry. Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 945,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota has held that a
Conflict of

special contract, made in one state, between a rail-

road company and a shipper, for transporting
property of the latter from a point in that state to a point in
another state, is to be interpreted according to the laws of the
former state; but that the courts of the other state will not
take judicial notice of the laws of the former, and they must
be proved as any other fact. If not so proved they will be
presumed the same as those of the state where the suit is
brought.
The same principle is asserted by the Supreme Court of
Vermont in Barrettv. Keley, 29 Atl. Rep. 8o9, which decides
that when a chattel is sold under a contract executed in
another state, reserving the legal title to the vendor until the
price is paid, the laws of the state where the contract is made
will govern the rights of the parties. Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island has ruled, on the authority of Milliken
v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, that when a married woman, a resident of one state, enters into a contract, in another state,
intended to take effect in that state, which, though valid
where made, is invalid in her own state, and the latter afterwards empowers her to make such a contract, the contract
may be there sued on: Case v. Dodge, .29 Atl. Rep. 785.
See Ruke v. Btuck (Mo.), 27 S. W. Rep.'412, mentioned in
i Am. L. Reg. & Rev. (N. S.) 664.
Lawk

The Supreme Court of New York has also adopted a very
wise and salutary restriction upon the rule of criminal evidence'
which requires a conspiracy to be proved before

the acts and declarations of one conspirator can
be given in evidence against his fellow conspirators, by holding in Peo. v. McKane, 3o N. Y. Suppl. 95, that such declarations may, when justice requires it, be admitted before proof
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of the conspiracy. The Supreme Court of Arizona holds a
contrary doctrine, under the provisions of the statutes of that
territory: Territory v. Turner, 37 Pac. Rep. 368.
This
exception, however, is not exactly an innovation, having been
asserted for years, though rarely. It may be applied when
the state promises to introduce prima fade evidence of the
conspiracy during the progress of the trial: State v. Grant,
(Iowa), 53 N. W. Rep. 120; and in general, its application
rests in the discretion of the court,- and is only permissible
under particular and urgent circumstances: Hall v. State,
(Fla.), 12 So. Rep. 449; State v. Flanders, (Mo.), 23 S. W.
Rep. io86.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has recently passed upon
one of the questions of constitutional law that continually recur
constitutional in regard to the taking of property under the right
Law
of eminent domain. .In Garrett v. Lake Roland
El. Ry. Co., 29 Atl. Rep. 830, that court decided that the
building of abutments, to be used as the approach for elevated
railway tracks, in the centre of the street, was not a taking of
the property of abutting landowners, within the meaning of
the clause of the constitution, forbidding the "taking" of
property for a public use without compensation being first paid
therefor or tendered, so as to entitle the landowners to enjoin
the erection of the same, until compensation was paid for the
injury; and this in spite of the fact that the bill showed that
the street was narrowed by the abutments to a mere alley, and
alleged that the erection deprived the adjacent premises of
light and air. Bryan, J., dissented, in an able and forcible
opinion.
The decision of the court may have been correct, on the
state of facts presented; but it does not carry any very convincing weight of authority.. It is unfortunately true that the
tendency of recent years has been to narrow the constitutional
provisions as to compensation for the taking of property to as
slender a compass as possible, in direct violation of every principle of construction, as witness, inter alia, the trolley road
cases. But to deny that the building of an elevated railroad
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is an additional servitude on the street would be sheer nonsense; and accordingly the court rested its ruling on the
ground that the deed of the landowners did not cover the soil
of the street, and therefore the abutments imposed no burden
on them. This is perhaps a tenable view, in the present unsettled state of opinion in regard to the ownership of the fee
of the streets of a municipal corporation; but ought to vanish
with a clear understanding of that point. The true solution
of the problem seems to be this. Strictly, in spite of all dicta
to the contrary, a municipal corporation does not own the fee
of the streets. It owns only the easemerit of the public
therein, and holds it in trust for the public; and can therefore
apply it to none but public uses, a restriction which would not
exist, if it owned the fee. The easement, however, is co-extensive with the use of the land, and the fee is therefore a mere
reversionary interest, contingent on the surrender of the rights
of the public on the vacating of the street. But to hold this
would be an absurdity, for this reversion may never occur, or
if it occur, there might be no heir of the original owner to
receive it. A better doctrine would be, to hold that the deeds
of the original owner to his vendees of lots bordering on such
streets, though nominally bounded by the street, extended to
the centre thereof, just as a deed of land bounded by a stream
extends ad filum aquxe, unless the contrary intention is clear.
On such a view, the erection in the present case would be
a burden on the plaintiff lot-owners, and they could recover.
But the chief objection to such a doctrine is, that it would
remove a very efficient means 'of protecting the corporations
which exercise the right of eminent domiiin, .and it is therefore not likely to be adopted.
The Supreme Court of California holds, that when a statute
does not authorize a change of venue for bias, prejudice or
partiality of a judge, it is a contempt of court to
Contempt
present an affidavit for a change of venue, alleging
those grounds: In reJones, 37 Pac. Rep. 385.
In Allen v. Leavens, 37 Pc. Rep. 488, the Supreme Court
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of Oregon has ruled that when goods are sold on the written
promise of the defendant to accept an order drawn
Contract
by the purchaser for the amount of the purchase,
the indorsement of the purchaser's name upon such promise
is not an order on which the defendant will be liable.
A curious question has 'just been decided in the House of
Lords in England, on appeal from Scotland. An employ6
of a stevedore, injured by.a defect in the tackle of
a vessel which he was engaged in unloading,
brought suit against the vessel for supplying weak tackle, and
against the stevedore for reckless negligence in tfie use of the
same. A decree was rendered creating a joint and several liability; but the plaintiff, as was his right, recovered the amount
of the judgment against one of the wrongdoers, who thereupon
brought action against the other to recover his share. The
Lords were of opinion, that in spite of the rule which forbids
contribution between joint wrongdoers, and which, were the
case an English-, one,. would be applied, on the authority of
JXVerryu'eather v. Nizan, 8 T. R. 186, the action could be
maintained: Palmer v. Wick and Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co.; Ltd., [1894], App. Cas. 318. This decision is not
really in contradiction of the general rule, above .stated, but
presents one of the two clearly defined exceptions to it, arising
from te circumstances of the parties. Contribution between
tort-fe;,sors is allowed, in the first place, when the parties act
in a bena fide belief that their act is lawful, and the wrong
arises by construction or inference of law: Vandiver v. Pollak,
(Ala.). 12 So. Rep. 473; or when the party seeking contribution was honestly ignorant of the fact that the act was wrongful: Johnson v. Torpy, 35 Neb. 604; S. C., 53 N.W. Rep. 575.
In the second place, it is allowed when, as in the case discussed, the torts of the two parties are not the same in their
nature, though arising from the same conditions; and they
cannot therefore be considered as strictly joint tort-feasors.
In such a case, the mere fact that the judgment imposes a
joint liability, cannot of course alter the true relation of the
parties as between themselves. 'his rule was applied, on a
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state of facts much like this, in MinneapolisMill Co. v. Wheeler,
31 Minn. 12 1, where it was held that the owner of premises
was liable for their unsafe condition, though resulting from
the negligence of a third person; but that he could recover
a full indemnity from that ihird person, as they were not in
pari delicto. The difference in the extent of the remedy
between the two cases is due to the fact that in the latter case
the negligence was passive, in the former active.
The same body has decided in Leslie v. Young, [1894]
App. Cas. 335, that the mere publication, in any particular
order, of the time tables issued by railway companies, cannot be claimed as a subject matter of
copyright by a publisher of a tourist's handbook, if no more
,has been done than to copy them in their order, leaving out
such stations as the author sees fit.
According to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, a
-corporation may vote, at the elections of a competing corporaCorporations tion, on stock held by the former in the latter, in
spite of a law of the state to the contrary, where
the competition affects interstate commerce only: Clarke v.
Richmond & W. P. Terninal Ry. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 328.
It has been decided by the Court of Appeals, in England,
that when a debenture, issued by*a company by way of floatDebentures ing security, contains a covenant for the payment
of the principal money, on a pecified day, though
without any stipulation making the money immediately payable in the event of a winding-up, the occurrence of a windingup before the specified day will render the money immediately
payable, and will entitle the holder of the debenture at once to
realize his security for the full amount of principal, interest,
and costs: Wallace v. UniversalAutomatic Machine Co., [1894]
2 Ch. 547. The same point was previously decided in Hodson v. Tea Co., 14 Ch. D. 859. See also, In re Panama,
New Zealand and AustralianRoyal Mail Co., 5 L. R. Ch. 318.
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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has very justly
ruled, in Cressey v. Wallace, 29 Atl. Rep. 842, that a devise to.
a married woman, to have and to hold to her sole
Devise
and separate use, free from any interference or control of her husband, and to her heirs and assigns, gives her a
fee, not a life estate, with remainder to her heirs; and they
will take by descent, not by purchase, on the ground that theclause "to her sole and separate use, etc.," does not in anyway qualify or limit the estate granted.
The adoption of the Australian ballot system, in spite of its.
many advantages, has given rise to a vast deal of litigation
over points that had theretofore been pretty well
settled; and has also unfortunately called forth

many conflicting decisions. One of the most vexed questions.
has been that which would seem to be the most simple,-the
marking of the ballot, and the consequent validity or invalidity
of the vote. In-the most recent case on the subject, Curran
v. Clayton, 29 At: Rep. 930, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that, under a statute requiring a cross mark in the
square at the right of the name of the party, or individual candidate, ballots marked as follows should be rejected: i. Wherethe cross mark was placed above the name of the candidate,
and r.,t in the appropriate place at the right of it. 2. Where
there was a cross mark above, and one below the name of thecandidate, but none at the right. 3. Where the cross mark
was placed at the left of the candidate's name. 4. Where
there was a cross mark under the party name at the head of
the ticket, and one at the left of the name of a candidate of
another party. 5. Where there was no cross mark, but a
short straight line, drawn across the square at the right of the
party name at the head of the ticket. 6. Where there was.
a cross mark in the square at the right of the name of each
candidate of one party, with one exception, and a cross markin the square at the right of the party name on another
column.
In all these cases, except the last, there could be no reasonable doubt as to the intention of the voter; but the court, dis-
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regarding the plain intention of the statute, which is to give
the voter a right to vote freely, without fear of intimidation, or
deprivation of his right of free suffrage, deliberately assumed
that the sole object of the act was to secure secrecy in voting,
and that as the peculiar marks might possibly be used, by prearrangement with the election officers, as a means of identifying
the ballot, they were therefore contrary to the spirit of the act,
and rendered the ballot void. There never was a clearer instance of the confusion of the means with the end. The intent
of the act was to secure a free vote; the secrecy provided for
was the most effectual means of securing that freedom. It is
lttle short of absurdity to claim that an independent voter
would deliberately furnish means to identify his ballot. But
even if he did so, it would be a most roundabout way of
accomplishing what he could do by simple word of mouth,
without let or hindrance-tell for whom he voted. If secrecy
was the only thinig desired, why- did not the legislature forbid
him to disclose his vote orally?
But the same misapprehension exists elsewhere, notably in
Indiana: Parnin v. Wimberg, 130 Ind. 561 ; S. C., 30 N. E.
Rep. 79 o . The Rhode Island courts are a little more liberal,
and, while insisting upon a mark to the right of the name, are
indifferent to its position, whether within or without the square:
Iln re Vote Marks, 17 R. I. 812. The same is the consensus
of opinion in the lower courts of Pennsylvania: Louck's Case,
3 D. R. 127; Weidknechtv. Hawk, 13 Pa. C. C. 4I; York
Election, 13 Pa. C. C. 205.
On other questions they are not agreed: some hold the
cross immaterial: Weidknecht v. Hawk, spra.; and that it is
sufficient to mark the ballot with a perpendicular stroke:
Hempfield Election, 14 Pa. C. C. 517; S. C., 3 D. R. 499;
others insist upon the cross mark as the palladium of their
liberties, or the well-known straw which the drowning man
trusts to for salvation, and reject ballots marked with two
horizontal lines in the circle intended for the mark: East
Coventry Election, 3 D. R. 377. Some admit the validity of a
cross mark without the square or circle, if close to the name
of the candidate or party: Louck's Case, 3 D. R. 127; others
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reject it unless within the circle: East Covcnti, Election, 377.
But the most hopeless conflict is over ballots marked as in the
sixth instance in the case under discussion, both after the
name of the party and the name of a candidate of another
party. Common sense would indicate that the voter intended
to vote for that candidate, at any rate, and such has been the
decision in some cases: Weidkneclzt v. Hawk, 13 Pa. C. C.4 1;
Twentieth Ward Election (IVo. 2), 3 D. R. 120. Legal acumen,
however, which is not necessarily synonymous with law, in its
boasted capacity of the perfection of human reason, would have
it different, and would reject the vote for that office altogether:
In re Election Instructions, 2 D. R. i.
In marked contrast with this futile splitting of hairs and
consequent nullification of the legislative intent, is the admirable decision in Woodward v. Sarsons, IO L. R. C. P. 733,
which holds that the main object of the ballot acts is to
secure the carrying out of the intent of the voter, and that
anything that goes to show that intent clearly is a valid
marking; and that therefore ballots marked with two crosses,
or three, instead of one, with a single stroke, a straight line,
a mark like an imperfect P added to the cross, a star, a
blurred or ill-marked cross, a pencil line through the names
of candidates not voted for, a cross to the left of the name,
and even a ballot paper torn in two longitudinally down the
middle, are good. A comparison of the lucid opinion in
which this doctrine was asserted with the abortive efforts at
special pleading in the cases cited above makes one blush for
his country. One American judge, however, has been found
with sufficient judgment to approve this decision, and to
assert, expressly on its authority, that a ballot without cross
marks, but with the names of candidates erased with lead
pencil, was to be counted for those whose names were not
erased: Coleman v. Gernet, 14 Pa. C. C. 578; S. C., 3 D. R. 500.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has recently
decided a very interesting point of law in Milfitclell v. MAarker,
62 Fed. Rep. 139, to the effect that a carrier by
elevator, though not an insurer of the safety of his
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passengers, is yet bound to exercise the highest degree of care,
as a carrier by railway or stage coach; that this rule applies
not only to the vehicle and machinery, but to the control and
management of the means of transportation ; and that it is theduty of the person who operates the elevator to give passengers a reasonable time to obtain a balance on entering the
car, before beginning a sudden and rapid upward movement,.
having a tendency to disturb the equilibrium of one yet in
motion.
In the opinion of the Superior Court. of New York
City, pictures painted on canvas, and cemented to the
Fixtures

ceiling, are fixtures, and are subject to the lien

of a mortgage on the building: Cohn v. Hensey,
29 N. Y. Suppl. 1 107..
According to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, when a
debtor, with intent to defraud his creditors, compromises claims
with his debtors, who have no knowledge or
notice of such fraudulent intent, the compromise
will not be set aside: Anderson v. Pilgram,19 S. E. Rep. 1002.
The Supreme Court of California has added itself to the list
of those courts which hold, in contradiction of every principle
Game Ls
of-reason and justice, that a statute, prohibiting the
sale of game out of season, applies to gamebrought from without the state, with the exception of that
sold in the original package: Exparte Maier, 37 Pac. Rep.
402. This train of decision was set on foot by. Chief Justice Coleridge, in Whitehead v. Smithers,- 2 C. P. D. 553, on
the totally inadequate ground that "it may well be that the
true and only mode of protecting British wild fowl from indiscriminate slaughter as well as of protecting other British
interests, is by interfering directly with the proceedings of
foreign persons. The object is, to prevent British wild fowl.
from being improperly killed and sold under pretence of
their being imported from abroad." But unhappily for his
lordship, no ordinary man would ever suspect that fact from
the wording of the act.
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This has been adopted as the correct view in a majority of
the courts that have had occasion to pass on the question:
17fagner v. Peo., 97 Ill. 320; State v. Randolpl, i Mo. App.
15; S. C., 3 Cent. L. J. 187; N. Y. Ass'n for Protection of
Game v. Durham, 19 J. & S. 3o6; Rothk v. State, 7 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 62; S. C. aff., 37 N. E. Rep. 259; and the same rule has
been applied to game killed in the state and kept in cold
storage: -State v. Judy, 7 Mo. App. 524; and to trout artificially propagated: Comm. v. Gilbert, 35 N. E. Rep. 454.
In refreshing contrast is the terse epigrammatic language of
Chief Justice Paxson, in Comm. v. Wilkenson, 1.39 Pa. 298;
S. C., 27 W. N. C. 16o; 21 Atl. Rep. 14; to the effect that
the object of the act being the preservation of game within the.
commonwealth, the court could not assume that it was intended
to preserve game elsewhere; and that it would be a forced
construction to hold that it was intended to exclude from the
-markets of the state game killed in other states, where, by the
laws of those states, the killing was lawful. This view has
been adopted by the courts of Michigan: Peo. 'v. O'Neil,
71 Mich. 325; S. C., 39 N.W. Rep. i; and of Massachusetts:
Comm. v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410. See also, Allen v. Young,
76 Me. 8o.
There is a stronger objection to this doctrine, however, than
that stated above. Many, if not all, of the statutes on this
question punish the possession of game out of season; and it is
submitted, that any law forbidding the possession of an article
by a person into whose hands it has come lawfully, is an interference with the right of personal property beyond the power
of any legislative body.
The judicial scrutiny of gambling transactions seems to
grow steadily more severe, and any qualification of the conGaming Con- tract, which affects the absolute ownership of the
tract
vendee, or evinces an intention to settle on the
basis of differences in -price, is eagerly seized upon as a badge
of illegality. The Supreme Court of California, in the most
recent case on the subject, Sheehy v. Shinn, 37 Pac. Rep. 393,
has ruled, that an agreement between vendor and vendee for
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the sale of stock upon payment of a part of the agreed price,
with a stipulation that it should be retained by the vendor as
security for the balance, and only be delivered upon full payment, and that the vendor should have the right to sell it at
any time, without notice to the vendee, if it should so depredate in the market as to be worth less than three times the
unpaid balance, is a sale on margin and for future delivery,
and void; and equally that an agreement that the defendant
should act as agent for plaintiff in buying stock for her from
third parties, and pay the whole price therefor, two-thirds of
which was "advanced by the plaintiff, with a stipulation that
the stock should be held by the defendant until the balance
was paid, and as collateral security for the balance due on
other stock, the title to remain in defendant while so held by
him,-was a sale on margin. This case seems v&ry near the
border line.
It has been decided by the Surrogate's Court of Cattaraugus County, New York, that when a minor, ten years old,
who
Guardianand has been brought up by a married woman,
has treated him as a son, and to whom he is very
Ward
much attached, the custody of the minor will not be taken
away from her and given to his guardian: Wentz's Estate,
3o N. Y. Suppl. 211.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has very justly ruled
that when subscriptions have been secured for the purpose
of building a church at a particular place, as a
njunation memorial to a certain person, an injunction will
issue to restrain the church society from. tearing down that
building, and removing the material to a different place, for
use in a building to be erected by such society at the latter
place: Cushman v. Church of Good Shepherd, 29 Atl. Rep.
872.
In the case of The Willamette Valley, 62 Fed. Rep. 293,
the District Court for the Northern District of California has
decided an interesting question as to the conflict
Jurisdiction of jurisdiction between the state and federal courts,
by holding that a steamship owned by an insolvent corpora-
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tion, and in possession of a receiver of the property of the corporation, ppointed by a state court, but employed by him in
transporting merchandise and passengers in connection with
the usual business of the corporation, between a port in the
state and a port in another state, is not exempt, by any rule of
comity, as in custodia legis, from maritime liens incurred in
such other states, and seizure to enforce such liens by libel in
the federal courts.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has just decided, that when
a lessee of a quarry agreed to pay a certain royalty on all rock
sold, to furnish the lessor with copies of all conLease
tracts to deliver rock, to work the mine in a workForfeiture
manlike manner, and to do a reasonable amount of work, and
also agreed that a failure to perform any of these agreements
should, at the option of the plaintiff, forfeit the lease; when
-the lessee used the quarry for two years, furnished no copies
'of contracts, and did not pay all* the rent, but performed all
the other covenants, while the plaintiff demanded no copies,
till a short time before bringing action, and demanded and
received rent many.times after a failure to pay according to
the terms of the lease; and when the lessee tendered copies of
the contracts and all rents due at the commencement of the
action-that under such circumstances the plaintiff must be
considered to have waived his right to a forfeiture: Little Rock
Granite Co. v. Shell, 27 S. W. Rep. 562.
In Fisk v. Capwell, 29 Atl. Rep. 84o, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island holds, in opposition to the general view, that an
instrument purporting to convey all the standing
wood on a certain lot of land, "with two years
from date hereof, to cut and remove said wood," does not
-convey any interest in the land, but is a mere license or executory contract, revocable at. any time before the wood is cut,
.and is revoked by the grantor's conveyance of the land to
.another. This may be true as to contracts in which the consideration is a royalty on the wood cut; but could not be
*justly applied to the sale of standing timber for a lump sum.
In that case the contract would be executed by the pay-
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-ment of the consideration, or if payable infitturo; perhaps by
the very fact of its being so fixed and determinate; and while
it is unnecessary to hold that the buyer had an interest in the
land, he would have the right of ingress and egress to cut and
remove his property, just as in the case of a sale of standing
grain, or potatoes in the ground.
The House of Lords, in Hewlett v.Allen, [r894] App. Cas.
383, has laid down a rule that will be of great interest to all
Masterand

those concerned in the [in]voluntary relief associa-

tions that have been established iii connection with
mnany large corporations. The plaintiff, on entering the service of the defendant, had signed an agreement to conform to
all the rules and regulations of the defendant's works, one of
which was that all employ6s should become members of the
sick and accident club. In accordance with the rules of this
club, weekly payments were made to the club treasurer by the
firm on account of each employ6, and from the fund thus
.established relief was given to members in case of sickness or
accident. The plaintiff received each week a ticket, showing
the gross amount of wages due her, and a weekly deduction
on account of the payment to the club, the balance alone being
paid her. She never required and never received any relief
from the fund. After leaving the employ of the defendant she
brought an action to recover the amount thus retained, alleging
that it was in violation of the English statute, providing that
"the entire amount of the wages earned by or payable to any
artificer . . shall be actually, paid to such artificer in the
current coin of this realm and not otherwise.'
But the lords
held, affirming [1892] 2 Q. B. 662, that the retention of the
club dues was not unlawful, on the principle that any payment
made by an employer, at the instance of a person employed,
to discharge some obligation of the employ6, or to place the
money in the hands of some person in whose hands the person
employed wishes it to be placed, is as much a "payment in
current coin" as if put in the hands of the employ6 himself.
The District Court for the District of Maryland has recently
held that a stevedore, bringing the baggage of a passenger on
Servant
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board a steamship, and placing it where requested by the passenger, is not exercising an independent employment, but isperforming a duty which rests on the ship; and it is the duty
of the ship's officers to see that risk of accidents to persons
on board is avoided: Unitus v. The Dresden, 62 Fed. Rep. 438.
In the opinion of the House of Lords, the failure of a station master to detain a train at the request of a passenger, in
order to give an opportunity for arresting persons by whom
the passenger has been robbed, and for the recovery of the
property stolen, creates no cause of action against the company: Cobb v. Great Western Ry. Co., 111894] App. Cas. 419.
The Supreme Court of Washington has lately afforded a
curious instance of the judicial propensity to give an unsound
reason for a just decision. In Anderson v. Guinean, 37 Pac.
Rep. 449, that court held, that a substitute, hired by an
employ6, stands in the place of the latter, with all of its
responsibilities and liabilities, so far as the master is concerned, and a fellow servant with the employ6 is a fellow
servant with the substitute, though no contractual relation.
exists between the substitute and the master, and though theemploy6 alone is responsible for the wages of the substitute..
This doctrine is wholly untenable. It would lead to mon-strous results if an employ6 could thus, by his own act,.
burden the master with responsibility for the acts of a substitute of whose employment he is ignorant. The master was
not liable in the case under discussion, it is true, but because
there was no privity between him and the substitute, not because
the other servants of the master were fellow servants of the
substitute. Or, if this view be preferred, the substitute was a
mere licensee, or perhaps a trespasser, to whom the master
owed no duty. On the other hand, if the master is ever liableto third persons for the acts of such a substitute, it is not on,
the ground that the act of the substitute is the act of the
master, but that the master, in allowing the substitute to act,
though ignorant of the fact of his acting, failed to perform a
duty with which he was charged.
. The Superior Court of New York City has reasserted the
doctrine, abundantly substantiated by the cases cited, that the
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fact that a servant was working on Sunday, in violation of the
,Sunday laws, when injured by reason of the master's negligence, will not preclude a recovery for such injuries: Solarz
-v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 29 N. Y. Suppl. I123.
In McCormick v. Soutlh Park Conrs., 37 N. E. Rep. 1074,
-the Supreme Court of Illinois has decided, that where a city
has repeatedly allowed property owners to erect
Municipal
Corporations buildings projecting into the streets, but has in each
case required the plan of the proposed projection to be presented to and approved by the city authorities before it was
dllowed to be built, the citizens do not thereby acquire any
right to build such projections without permission.
The Supreme Court of Washington has given a valuable
decision in regard to the manner of voting in deliberative
bodies, in Buckley v. Tacoma, 37 Pac. Rep. 446, by holding
that when, by law, a certain proportion of the body is required
to pass a measure before it, it cannot be done by a viva voce
vote, on the ground that "in no case where a fixed proportion
of members must vote to carry a measure, is it possible to
ascertain the result by the viva voce plan."
The Supreme Court of Missouri holds, that it is, as a matter
of law, actionable negligence for a manufacturer to obstruct for
weeks the street in front of his premises for the
Negligence
purpose of receiving and discharging his goods:
Gerdes v. Chiristopher and Simpson Architectural Iron and
Foundry Co., 27 S. W. Rep. 614; but according to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in the absence of a statute giving a remedy, a city is not liable for damaget for the taking
of human life by a mob, although its officers may have been
negligent in preserving the public peace: New Orleans v.
Abbagnato, 62 Fed. Rep. 240.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has recently ruled
that the constitutional prohibition against changing the comOfficers
pensation of any public officer "during his term of
office," does not apply to a deputy appointed by
an officer to hold during the pleasure of the latter, as the word

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

"term" applies to a fixed period: Somers v. State, 59 N. W_
Rep. 962. See State v.Johnson, (Mo.), 27 S. W. Rep. 399.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota adheres to the doctrinethat partnership capital invested in land for the benefit of the
partnership will be treated as personalty, and not
be subject to dower or inheritance, until it has
performed all its functions to the partnership, and has thereby
ceased to be partnership capital, and that accordingly the
inchoate title of the wife of a partner attaclhes to only that part
of such real estate remaining in specie, unconverted, after
the complete termination of the partnership: -WoodwardHohnes Co. v. Medd., 59 N. W. Rep. ioio.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds an instrument
for the payment of money at the death of the maker good:
Promissory Marten v. Stone, 29 Atl. Rep. 845 ; and the Supreme
Notes
Court of Idaho has ruled, that a note without grace
made payable in a bank, placed and remaining therein for collection, till due, may be sued upon after banking hours on the
evening of the day it falls due, when the opening and closing
hours are well known to the maker: Sabin v. Burke, 37. Pac.
Rep. 352.
According to the Supreme Court of Florida, a plea of non
usurpavit is not proper in proceedings on an information in the
Quo Warranto nature of a quo warranto, at the relation of a private person, upon refusal of the attorney general
to institute suit; for in such a proceeding, when the relator
has shown a prima facie right to the office, the respondent
-must show by what title he holds: Buckman v. State, 15 So.
Rep. 697.
In Chicago,R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Staley, 62 Fed. Rep. 363,
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, has decided that
when a statute of one state, which has 'there received a settled construction, is adopted in another
state, and the Supreme Court of that state puts a different construction upon it, the latter construction will be accepted by
the Federal courts as the true construction within that state.
Statutes,
Construction

